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Abstract
We propose a new version of the spatial model of voting. Platforms of
five parties are evolving in a two-dimensional landscape of political issues
so as to get maximal numbers of voters. For a Gaussian landscape the
evolution leads to a spatially symmetric state, where the platform centers
form a pentagon around the Gaussian peak. For a bimodal landscape the
platforms located at different peaks get different numbers of voters.
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1 Introduction
Dynamics of public opinion is a central subject in political sciences. As votes
can be described with numbers, research in this field belongs at least partially
to the behavioral tradition in America or to the sociophysics in Europe. Indeed,
opinion dynamics attracts attention of several authors in the Old Continent [1, 2,
3, 4, 5]. In these approaches, the process considered is that voters, convinced by
other voters, change their opinions about parties. However, there has been also
an opposite point of view, established in literature for 50 years [6]. According to
this point, parties adopt political platforms in order to to get maximal number
of voters. Although it is clear that in reality both processes occur, it seems
advisable to investigate the latter separately, as if opinions of voters remain
constant in time. Such a search is our purpose here.
Actually, there is at least one argument that the variations of political plat-
forms to meet the voter’s preferences are quicker than the changes of voter’s
preferences. This argument is as follows: a standard voter is not economically
motivated to optimize his performance. It is clear that one vote cannot change
a political landscape. Then our political preferences are based rather on an
identification with a given politician than on acceptance of his program. Pro-
grams are long, complicated and devious, whereas people can be qualified as
fine or not in seconds [7]. As a result, many vote for candidates who look good
on TV. On the contrary, politicians are strongly motivated to fight for voters.
There, the difference between success and failure is equivalent to the difference
between being Prime Minister and being unemployed. In this aspect, politi-
cians can then be expected to be much smarter, better informed and quicker
than voters. If this is so, the variations of platforms can be described with an
assumption that the preferences of voters are constant in time. This is a sort
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of adiabatic approximation. In fact, both processes occur: the platforms move
and the voters change their opinion, but in many cases the characteristic time
of the latter is longer. Once the platforms are established, most of voters have
no choice but to vote for a platform prepared for them: workers for the left,
bussiness for the right, intellectuals for professors, young for greens etc. The
coupling between well-defined platforms and clusterized groups of voters has an
additional feedback formed by media: every reader finds a newspaper where
things are presented according to his own opinion. To be precise, a platform
should be understood as a set of issues which can serve as criteria for voters. A
choice of these issues does depend on tradition and history. However, final out-
put of a candidate appears to depend also on his/her charisma, age, sex, height
and health which we are well-trained by the Darwinian evolution to evaluate
[7].
In this perspective, the game between politicians and voters is no more
equivalent to a time evolution of the statistical distribution of opinions on static
issues. It is close rather to a deterministic search for herds of voters, unable
to change their opinions. These herds form a political landscape in a multi-
dimensional space of issues [8]. The picture is known as spatial voting model.
The deterministic character of the time evolution can however be relaxed by the
incomplete knowledge on the public opinion. Indeed, much money is paid by
governments to recognize the voters’ response for issues which could or could
not be a basis of a winning platform [9]. Here we adopt the approach of Koll-
man, Miller and Page [10, 11], who simulated the evolution of platforms in a
given landscape. In these works, the incomplete knowledge on the landscape
was reflected by the time evolution rules, determined by the landscape only at
the actual position of the platform. Here we use the same locality principle. On
the other hand, we feel to continue the sociophysical tradition, asking for the
probability distribution of votes [1, 5]. The aim of this paper is to investigate
this distribution in a given landscape. Namely, we ask if there is any connection
between the distribution of votes and the shape of the landscape.
In Section II the model is explained. The results are described in Section III
and discussed in Section IV. Final conclusions close the text.
2 The model
In computer simulations, the incompleteness of knowledge was reflected [10, 11]
by using one of three approaches: random search, local hill-climbing and genetic
algorithm. As the results of these approaches are qualitatively the same, we feel
free to use one of them, namely the hill-climbing algorithm. The model space
of issues is limited here to two dimensions, x and y. The criterion of selection
of issues is that they should have a discriminative power. For example, slavery
does not fulfil this criterion. On the contrary, this discriminative power cannot
be too large; a woman who wants her husband to be Prime Minister cannot
gather a party around this postulate. Still, a rich spectrum of possible between
these two extremes.
Having the axes, one should be able to construct the landscape. Here again
we encounter another eternal problem in social sciences: the scale. As it is
known from the utility theory, scales do depend on the respondent [12], what
makes the construction subjective. Various solutions of the problem can be
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found in [13]. Here we intend to postulate that a landscape of an unbiased
issue should be close to a Gaussian function, just by nature of statistics. By
unbiased we mean that i) no abrupt changes of the opinion happened recently,
ii) people are not personally engaged into an issue. If they are engaged, bimodal
distributions are likely to appear [14].
Initial positions of the platforms are selected randomly, with uniform dis-
tribution. The number of platforms is arbitrary, but this choice is supported
by some common sense. Parties which get small amounts of votes do not enter
into parliaments in many countries. Moreover, their results in our simulation
would be probably distorted by statistical errors of the order of their yields.
The time evolution is governed by the principle of hill-climbing: if a party can
get more votes by a shift of the position of its platform, the shift is done. We
note that this algorithm was checked in [10] to produce similar results as the
random-search algorithm and the genetic algorithm. The length of steps in the
space of issues is arbitrary, but small with respect to a characteristic length of
the landscape variation. Our algorithm is equivalent to a differential equation
δyi
δt
= ∇ywi(y) (1)
where w = (w1, .., w5) is the number of votes gained by i− th party at position
yi in two-dimensional space of issues. The number of votes of i − th party is
calculated from its position in the space of issues,
wi =
∫
dxρ(x)g(yi − x)[1 −
1
N
∑
j
g(yj − x)] (2)
where the function g(x) describes the profile of votes as dependent on the po-
sition of the platform. Here it is selected to be also Gaussian, with the width
σ set as 2−1/2. The second term under the integral describes the interaction
between the parties, which is repulsive; it can be more beneficial for a party to
explore voters in an area where other parties are not active, even if the number
of voters is somewhat smaller there. From the point of view of a physicist, the
defined system is analogous to five interacting overdamped particles, looking
for local equilibria in a potential minimum. The potential is the landscape with
inverted sign. The resulting set of equations of motion for i = 1, ..., 5 is
dyi
dt
= −
2yi
1 + 2σ2
I(i) +
∑
j
2yi + 4σ
2(yi − yj)
N(1 + 4σ2)
J(i, j) (3)
where I(i), J(i, j) are scalar quantities
I(i) =
1
pi(1 + 2σ2)
exp
(
−
y2i
1 + 2σ2
)
(4)
and
J(i, j) =
1
pi(1 + 4σ2)
exp
(
−
y2i + y
2
j + 2σ
2(yi − yj)
2
1 + 4σ2
)
(5)
and N = 5 is the number of parties. The term with J(i, j) describes the
repulsion between parties i and j. We keep J(i, i) = 0. Equation (3) is solved
numerically. In general, Eq. 1 reduces to a differential equation, provided that
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the product of functions under the integral (2) can be approximated by a linear
combination of products of Gaussian functions and polynomial functions.
3 Results and discussion
First we consider the landscape which is a single Gaussian function with its
maximum at the coordination centre. We performed the calculations for several
sets of initial positions of the platforms in the two-dimensional space of issues.
For large values of σ, the emerging result is always the same: the centers of the
platforms tend to equidistant positions on a circle, formed around the peak of
the Gaussian peak of the landscape. Example of the trajectories is shown in
Fig. 1. Even if the initial position of one party is on the top of the peak, i.e. in
the center of coordinates, this party gets down the peak and finally is placed on
the circle. In stable equilibrium, the yields wi of all the parties become equal.
This kind of symmetry should appear for any number of parties; we checked
that it is true for N = 2.
In principle, it could be expected that one party, initially closest to the
centre, will be able to fix its platform there before the other parties. On the
contrary to this expectations, a central platform placed at the peak gets down
and moves to a position equivalent to those of other platforms. The memory of
the initial state is lost except the angular coordinates of the parties. In Fig.2
we show final positions of the platforms, reached from several random initial
positions.
If the width of the landscape peak σ is small enough, it becomes worthwhile
for the parties to occupy the top of the peak even if shared with platforms of
other parties. We can apply the stability analysis to investigate the stability of
the situation when all platforms are situated at the peak top. For two parties,
the result is analytical: for σ > ((1 + 21/2)/2)1/2 ≈ 1.1, the point yi = 0 is
not stable. This means, that the coexistence at the top is not fruitful. For five
parties, the critical value of σ is about 1.18. However, even fairly below this
value the time evolution of the platforms is very slow near the top, and the
above stability is hard to be evaluated from the numerical solution.
It is clear that the obtained circular symmetry must vanish if the landscape
is not symmetric. As it was recognized in [11], the ability of a platform to get
an optimal position decreases with the landscape ruggedness. In particular, for
a bimodal landscape it is obvious that the hill-climbing algorithm traps some
platforms at a peak which is maybe more occupied and therefore less favorable.
Now we consider a landscape formed from two Gaussian peaks, placed in
equal distances from the coordination centre. Their coordinates are (0, c) and
(0,−c), and the latter is 3/2 times higher. As chosen previously, σ = 2.5 for
both peaks. In Fig.3 we show how the final positions of five platform centers
are distributed for various values of c. As we see, for short distance 2c between
the peaks all parties are close to the higher peak. In this case, their yields wi
are equal. As c increases, we observe some kind of phase locking; a platform
is located between the peaks and the repulsion between platforms leads them
to fixed positions on some curve around the peak where wi = const. Finally,
when c is large enough, the peaks can be considered as independent. In this case
the peak selected by a platform does depend on the initial position of all the
platforms. In principle, all partitions are possible, i.e. (0− 5), (1− 4), (2− 3),
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Figure 1: Trajectories of platforms of five parties, starting from random initial
positions. The density of points increases with time, because the velocity of
platforms decreases. This reveals the direction of the trajectories, which is
generally to the center. However, one of them (in the center of the lower part
of the figure) changes the direction, repulsed by the others.
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Figure 2: Positions of five platforms after some time, averaged over 100 random
initial positions.
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Figure 3: Positions of five platforms after some time, averaged over 1000 random
initial positions for a) c = 1.5, b) c = 3.0, c) c = 3.5, d) c = 5.5.
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(3−2), (4−1) and (5−0). The weights of these partitions depend on the shape
of the landscape, but it may be approximated by the binomial distribution. The
numbers of voters wi do depend on the partition. It is best for a party to be
only one occupying the maximum, even if this is the lower one.
4 Discussion
Some conclusions drawn from our results are at least not contradictive with a
common experience. First, equilibrium positions of the platforms are to be in
maximal possible distance. This makes an accordance between parties generi-
cally difficult, even if they are close to each other in their programs. Second, the
strongest hostility can be expected between parties with neighboring platforms,
because they fight for voters. Third, isolated maxima of the electoral landscape
are expected to be willingly occupied even if these maxima are small. This is
our contribution to an interpretation of extremist parties, which appear to be
good ecological niches for some politicians. As a rule, the bosses of these parties
are authoritary, as they are not forced to make compromises with neighbors -
they have none. Fourth, the emerging picture is a convenient basis to investigate
the response of parties for evolution of the electoral landscape. In particular,
suppose that we take into account an increasing disappointment of voters with
a ruling party. Their program is not executed or not fully executed, affairs
disgrace their government and initial hope that their electoral victory will push
the country into a prosperous future has no more support. To introduce these
known facts to the spatial model, it is enough to reduce gradually the function
g of the ruling party, until its supremacy is lost. The effect is known as political
pendulum. After several cycles, the process leads to a fragmentation of political
scene, until new issues appear.
To conclude, in the spatial model of voting the positions of the political
platforms is a part of the game, and it has not much to do with historical
tradition of the parties. We note that this result cannot be obtained in a one-
dimensional model, where the repulsion between parties prevents them to profit
the same groups of voters. In a sense, our model could be applied to a problem
of division of territories with herds of cattle between shepherds, or groups of
buyers between companies. In all these problems, repulsion between shepherds
(or companies or platforms) is a natural consequence of deficience of resources
in areas where two owners can met. Our results indicate that the positions
of platforms display a kind of a collective optimization, where a supremacy of
one party is unstable. Politically, the emerging system can be compared to an
oligarchy, where the influence of each local ruler is taken into account by its
neighbors.
We should note that there are also other politicians and parties who - for
various reasons - do not try to get more votes. Obviously, their performance
cannot be captured with the above description. However, it is only rarely that
we can see them as winners of an election.
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